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‘Secularism (laïcité): the word smells of gunpowder; it evokes passionate and contradictory 
resonances; and the contradiction is not just the usual one where minds are opposed for or 
against a clear idea; it relates to the very content of the notion, and the meaning of the notion. 
These disagreements should not surprise us. The notion of secularism was born in tumult: the 
conflict of ideas and, above all, the conflict of parties. It conveys the intuitions, 
temperaments, mystiques. Moreover, it does not follow from a calm development and an 
effort at definition (Jean Rivero).’2 
Whilst article 1 of the Constitution of 1958 defines the Republic as ‘laïque’ and freedom of 
conscience is a general value and part of employment rights within the Preamble to the 1946 
Constitution, but there is no proper definition of secularism. The result is that the law is built 
up from the outcome of sniper attacks from one side or the other over many years. The best 
restatements are contained in official reports, notably the Stasi Report of 20033 and in the 
advisory opinions of the Conseil d’Etat on specific issues. Paragraphs 10 to 18 of the Stasi 
Report suggests that the common destiny of France comes through the ‘yeast of secularism’. 
It argues that ‘secularism balances recognition of one’s own identity with efforts necessary to 
knit together individual beliefs  through social bonds’.4 As the Conseil constitutionnel has 
stated:5 
The principle of secularism is listed among the rights and freedoms which the 
Constitution guarantees. The neutrality of the State follows from it. It also follows 
that the Republic does not recognise any religion. The principle of secularism requires 
especially respect for all beliefs, the equality of all citizens before the law regardless 
of religion and that the Republic guarantees the freedom of religious practice. It 
implies that the State does not fund any religion. 
Secularism is a regular preoccupation of the administrative courts, both in their judicial and 
in their advisory capacities. Recent high profile decisions of the Conseil d’Etat have 
confirmed this. But there is a strong line of consistency in the approach of these courts for the 
last hundred years. 
                                                          
1 The author admits to being a minister of religion in the Catholic Church and a regular invited professor at 
French universities. 
2 J. Rivero, ‘La notion juridique de laïcité’ D 1949 Chr 137. 
3 Commission de reflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcite dans la Republique, Rapport au President de 
la République (Paris 2003). 
4 Ibid, para. 17. 
5 Decision 2012-297 QPC of 21 February 2013, para. 5. 
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Within the legal issues relating to secularism, one can identify three different areas of 
concern: the funding and support for religious activities, the requirements for the delivery of 
public services (including the behaviour of public service personnel), and the behaviour of 
users of the public service. 
The funding of religious activities is governed by the loi of 9 December 1905,6 which ended 
the Concordat with the Papacy of 1802. Under article 2, the basic principle is that religious 
activities are not to be subsidised:  ‘La République ne reconnaît, ne salarie ni ne subventionne 
aucun culte’ (‘the Republic neither recognises, nor employs nor supports any religion’). 
Under the Concordat, the Catholic Church was the established religion and its priests were 
paid by the State. The State may indirectly pay money for activities associated with religion, 
but never directly. Most obviously, under the 1959 Loi Debré it makes contracts with the 
bodies running some church schools in order to provide education. Likewise, the State 
supports the upkeep of many churches as heritage monuments either by the property 
belonging to local authorities7 or by way of payment to church associations. But the State 
does not purchase religious services. 
In the recent Christmas Crib case,8 the issue arose whether a local authority could erect a 
Christmas crib on its premises or whether this breached the prohibition on subsidising 
religion. As was noted in the Rapport Public of the Conseil d’Etat in 2004, ‘the problems 
connected with the fact that French secularism is a secularism “on a Christian foundation” 
should not be under-estimated’.9 So in this case, how could traditional Christmas practices be 
reconciled with a secular state? 
In this case, the local association of free thinkers asked the mayor of Melun to refrain from 
having a Christmas crib in the Hôtel de Ville. The mayor continued with the installation and 
the association brought an action to quash the decision for illegality. They appealed to article 
28 of the loi of 1905 which prohibited the erection or imposition of a religious symbol on any 
public building. (This was originally directed against having a crucifix.)  
A crib is a depiction capable of bearing several meanings. Of course it is a scene 
which is part of Christian iconography and which therefore has a religious 
significance. But it is also an element in the decorations and illustrations which 
traditionally and without any particular religious significance accompany the end of 
year festivities.  
This plurality of meanings enabled the Conseil to fudge the question of whether the crib was 
permitted. It all depends on the facts. Legally, it is only permitted  ‘ when it has a cultural, 
                                                          
6 Note that this loi does not apply to Alsace or Lorraine which were part of Germany at the time. Hence it is 
possible that a theologian can be president of Strasbourg university: see Le Monde, 13 December 2016. See 
generally, Conseil Constitutionnel, 2012-297 QPC of 21 February 2013. 
7 The decision in CE Ass 18 November 1949, Carlier, decided that churches belonging to the commune under 
the 1905 loi were part of public property. 
8 CE Sect, 9 November 2016, Fédération départementale des libres penseurs de Seine-et-Marne, decision no. 
395122. 
9 Rapport Public 2004, ‘Un siècle de laïcité’, p. 392 
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artistic or festive character, without expressing the endorsement of a religion or 
demonstrating a preference for any religion’. So legality all depends on the facts of the case 
and the intentions of those who set up the crib. It also depends on where it is set up. The 
Conseil d’Etat stressed that the neutrality of public buildings prevented the setting up of a 
crib unless it was a purely cultural, artistic or festive icon. By contrast, it is possible to set a 
crib up in a public street, unless it has a proselytizing purpose. By simply noting that the crib 
depicted the founder of Christianity as its justification for concluding that this was a religious 
symbol, the Cour administrative d’appel of Paris had failed to give a legal basis for its 
decision to quash the decision of the mayor. It needed to look further into the purposes 
pursued by the mayor in installing a crib.  
The Christmas Crib case follows the basic principle on the absence of funding or affixing 
symbols, but in a different way from what the 1905 loi envisaged. That loi was concerned 
with public bodies transferring funds to be spent on religious activities or setting up symbols. 
The loi is now interpreted as being about the way in which the state may be seen to endorse 
religion. This decision was subsequently applied by the Tribunal Administratif of Grenoble in 
ordering the removal of a statute of the Virgin Mary erected by the local authority some 5 
years earlier. 
When it comes to regulating the conduct of public services and the behaviour of public 
servants, French law has been rigorous. The legislation in relation to the public competition 
to become a secondary teacher has provided since 1852 that candidates be approved by the 
Rector of the local Academy and by the Minister of Education. It was held in 1912 that the 
Minister could reject a Catholic priest as a candidate to become a secondary teacher in 
philosophy. The ground was that his church role made it impossible for him to demonstrate 
that he would conduct his teaching with the impartiality and neutrality necessary.10 (In those 
days, Catholic priests were obliged by canon law to wear clerical dress.) This opinion was 
controversial. An opinion of the Conseil d’Etat some 60 years later concluded that secularism 
and the neutrality which it requires did not automatically prevent a cleric from becoming a 
school teacher.11 Article 1 of the loi of 1905 declared that ‘The Republic ensures freedom of 
conscience’. But the principle of secularism prevents public employees from having the right 
to express their religious beliefs, especially by wearing any insignia which would 
demonstrate their membership of a specific religion.12  
The decision of the Cour de cassation’s Assemblée Plénière upholding the right of a private 
nursery to sack a Muslim teaching assistant because she refused to remove her jilhab at work 
has been well commented elsewhere.13 The internal rules of the nursery required a balance 
between freedom of religion and respect for the principles of neutrality and secularismin all 
the activities in which personnel were engaged. The civil courts found that, in this nursery, 
there was not a general philosophical ban on wearing religious insignia, but one which was 
limited. It arose from taking account of the small team of employees and the direct 
                                                          
10 CE 10 May 1912, Abbé Bouteyre S. 1912.3.145 note Hauriou; D. 1914.3.74 conclusions Heilbronner. 
11 Avis 21 September 1972. See the earlier decisions in the post-1944 period quashing the refusal to accept teh 
candidature of Catholics for teaching posts : Rivero, above note 1, p 139. 
12 CE Avis 3 May 2000, Mlle Marteaux, Leb.169. 
13 Cass. Ass. Plén, 25 June 2014, JCP 2014 J 903. See M. Hunter-Hénin, ‘Religion, Children and Employment: The 
Baby Loup Case’ (2015) 64 ICLQ 717. 
Commented [ 1]: Correct? 
4 
 
relationship of this role with both parents and children, as well as being proportionate in 
realising the goal of ‘developing a social action directed to small children in a deprived 
working-class area in order to enable women to work without making any distinction in terms 
of political or religious opinion’. The Cour de cassation quashed the broader grounds offered 
by the Cour d’appel which related to whether the nursery was an organisation with a 
particular set of beliefs that would justify derogations from the freedom of religion under the 
European Convention on Human Rights. In other words, it turned the question of whether a 
ban was permissible into a fact-sensitive question. Earlier parts of this litigation had led the 
French Ombudsman (the Défenseur des droits) to invite the Conseil d’Etat to give an 
advisory opinion on the role of religious neutrality and public services.  
The opinion of the Conseil d’Etat14 indicated that the private sector might be involved in 
public services if the activity was in the general interest, it was in some way controlled by the 
administration and either it was able to exercise public power or the public body was 
involved in the fixing of specific objectives to be performed and in the control over whether 
they were delivered. These requirements go beyond mere subsidy or regulation of an activity. 
But the Conseil took the view that, as a general principle, outside this area of public services, 
the principles of secularism and neutrality were not legally required. In consequence, the ban 
on employees of a public service manifesting their religious beliefs applies only to public 
employees or employees employed by private bodies who are involved in the operation of a 
public service. The result is that private bodies delivering public services (often on a 
contracted out basis such as in transport or health services) are subject to the rules on neutral 
secularism when delivering public services. This affects the freedom of religious expression 
of their employees. (You cannot wear a cross as a bus driver driving children to and from a 
state school, but you can wear a cross in the evening taking an office party from a business to 
a restaurant.) In public services the requirement to observe religious neutrality is not subject 
to a condition of proportionality. This is the major difference with the reasoning of the Cour 
de cassation in the Baby Loup case. Miriam Hunter-Hénin criticises the lack of rigour in 
looking at evidence to justify the need for a ban in the Baby Loup case.15 The evidence was 
hypothetical and lacking empirical evidence, rather than actual, and that would normally not 
be enough. In the public sector, no such careful analysis is required. 
 
Users of public services are given more freedom. As the Conseil d’Etat’s advice of 2013 
pointed out ‘the user of a public service is not, in principle, bound by the requirement of 
religious neutrality.16’ But there is a long history of attempts by secular mayors to clamp 
down on religious practices in public. The struggles between secular mayors and Catholic 
clergy were regular events in the years leading up to World War I. Under article 27 of the 
1905 Loi ‘ceremonies, processions and other external manifestations of a religion are 
regulated according to [the general powers of mayors in relation to public order].’ In Abbé 
Olivier,17 the commune of Sens had banned Catholic clergy from taking part in funeral 
processions wearing their vestments on the ground that this was necessary to maintain public 
order. The Conseil d’Etat accepted that the mayor could ban processions, marches and 
ceremonies which were external manifestations of a religion, but this could not extend to 
                                                          
14 19 December 2013. 
15 Ibid, at p 724. 
16 Page 30. 
17 CE 19 February 1909, S 1909.3.34, conclusions Chardenet; D 1910.3.121 conclusions Chardenet. 
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banning traditional funeral processions unless there was a serious reason of public order to 
justify a restriction. In that case, the mayor and the commune failed to provide evidence that 
their decision had been taken in the light of such public order considerations. The need for 
the Conseil d’Etat to quash attempts by public authorities to use such public order powers to 
prevent religious processions did not go away.18 
From the late 1980s, the target has moved from Catholics to Muslims, particularly in relation 
to schools. In 1989, the Conseil d’Etat produced an opinion setting out the basic principles 
governing the wearing of religious insignia by pupils at school (notably the burqua). In brief, 
it affirmed the freedom of conscience and that the wearing of religious symbols was not, in 
itself, contrary to secularism. But the Conseil insisted that this must not disrupt the running of 
the public service and so the wearing of ostentatious or campaigning symbols which 
constituted an act of pressure, provocation, proselytising or propaganda could be prohibited.19 
Thus, school pupils may be excluded legitimately if they disrupt excessively the normal 
running of their school through their exercise of their freedom of expression.20 In a 1996 
case, 17 young women wearing headscarves at a secondary school in Lille engaged in a 
demonstration within the school which disrupted its normal operations. As a result they could 
be excluded. But the Conseil d’Etat went out of its way to state that the wearing of the 
headscarf by these 17 pupils did not constitute in itself an ‘ostentatious sign whose wearing 
was an act of pressure or proselytising’.  
The Stasi Report of 2003 reviewed the position and led to a loi in 2004.During the 
parliamentary deliberations, Jean-Paul Costa, then a judge of the European Court of Human 
Rights, gave evidence. Having been a senior member of the Conseil d’Etat when it produced 
its opinion in 1989, it was not surprising that he suggested that the ban on religious signs did 
not violate fundamental freedoms. He also expressed the view that the ban on religious signs 
would be upheld, should it come to his Court. The loi was duly passed on 15 March. In the 
June of the same year, a Section of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg heard 
a case involving a ban on the wearing of Moslem dress in a Turkish university.21 The Court 
drew on the Stasi report and the French loi as indicating a diversity of opinion in Europe and 
favoured a large margin of appreciation for national legislators. This view was then upheld in 
2005 by the Grand Chamber, in which Costa sat as a Judge.22 The Strasbourg Court’s ruling 
was also drawn on with approval by the French Conseil constitutionnel in a decision of 
November 2004 on the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union.23 It concluded that the 
interpretation given by the Strasbourg Court did not create any incompatibility between the 
Charter and French constitutional principles of secularism. The Conseil cited the Strasbourg 
Court’s decision explicitly to show that the French principles of secularism would be 
permitted ‘which prohibit anyone from relying on religious beliefs to exempt themselves 
from general rules governing the relationships between public authorities and individuals’. 
                                                          
18 See CE 25 January 1939, Abbé Marzy, Leb. 709; CE 14 May 1982, Association internationale pour la 
conscience de Krishna Leb. 179. 
19 Avis 27 November 1989. 
20 CE 27 November 1996, Ligue Islamique du Nord Leb.461. See generally, the ‘Circulaire Fillon’ of 18 May 
2004, JORF 22 May 2004, p 9033 implementing the loi of 15 March 2004 on the wearing of religious insignia in 
schools. 
21 Application no 4774/98 of 29 June 2004. 
22 Leyla Sahin v Turkey, Grand Chamber 10 November 2005. 
23 J. Bell, ‘French Constitutional Council and European Law’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 735 
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That view was confirmed in SAS v France,24 when the 2010 loi banning the wearing of the 
full-face veil in public was upheld by the Strasbourg Court. So the debate in France centres 
on the application of French principles, rather than the European Convention.25  
The case law on both the power to restrict public expressions of religious practice on grounds 
of public order and to control the exercise of religious liberty by the users of public services 
is essentially casuistic. The reconciliation between the right of religious freedom and the 
neutrality of the public service encourages a similar casuistic and fact-sensitive approach. 
This is seen clearly in the Burkini case in the summer of 2016.26 In the wake of the terrorist 
attack in Nice on 14 July, the mayor of the southern French commune of Villeneuve-Loubet 
issue a byelaw governing public order and security on local beaches. It prohibited access to 
the beaches to ‘any person not appropriately dressed, respecting good morals and the 
principle of secularism, and respecting the rules of hygiene and safety of bathers relating to 
the public seashore. The wearing of clothes during bathing having a significance contrary to 
the above-mentioned principles is strictly forbidden on the beaches of the commune.’ This 
was clearly directed against clothing which manifested that a person belonged to a particular 
religion. The byelaw was challenged by the national Ligue des droits de l’homme and an 
association against Islamophobia. They failed to obtain an interlocutory order from the 
Tribunal administrative of Nice suspending the byelaw, but, in a decision only four days 
later, the Conseil d’Etat ruled that it should be suspended. 
The grounds of the suspension of the byelaw related essentially to the facts, rather than to the 
principle, because the role of the administrative courts is simply to review substantive 
judgments of policy made by the administration. The authorising power, art.2212-1 of the 
Code on local government, entitled the mayor to regulate public order, security, safety and 
public health in the commune including beaches. The Conseil d’Etat interpreted the power 
essentially in line with the way it had construed the same power in the loi of 1884 in the case 
of Abbé Olivier. The first point is that the power to maintain order has to be exercised in a 
way that respects the freedoms guaranteed by law. The second and consequent point is that 
the measures taken in respect of bathing must be ‘appropriate, necessary and proportionate 
having regard only to the requirements of public order, such as follow from the circumstances 
of time and place’. No other circumstances may be taken into account, and the mayor needed 
to show that the measures were justified by risks of threats to public order. The Conseil noted 
that the mayor was unable to present in the oral hearing any evidence of a risk threatening 
public order. In the absence of such risks, the mere emotion and fears resulting from the 
terrorist attacks in the general area did not constitute a sufficient justification for public order 
measures. As in the Abbé Olivier decision, the evidence was not forthcoming and so the 
decision was illegal.  Since there was a serious infringement with fundamental freedoms of 
movement, of conscience and of the person and the byelaw was manifestly illegal, the 
Conseil suspended it pending a full hearing (which will no doubt never take place). The 
Conseil d’Etat did try to provide some guidance to the 34,486 local mayors in France 
exercising these powers. 
The Conseil d’Etat is essentially trying to navigate the balancing of conflicting principles by 
legalism and the insistence on evidence-based policy-making. At the same time, French law 
                                                          
24 [2014] ECHR 695, Application no. 43835/11. M. Hunter-Hénin, ‘Living Together in an Age of Religious 
Diversity: Lessons from Baby Loup and SAS’ [2015] Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 1. 
25 For criticism, see Ilias Trispiotis, ‘Two Interpretations of “Living Together”’ [2016] CLJ 580. 
26 CE Ordonnance of 26 August 2016, Ligue des droits de l’homme, nos 402742, 402777. 
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is trying to move on a distinctive path.27 At the same time, it claims to be part of the 
mainstream of European view in that secularism is claimed to be part of the freedom of all 
guaranteed by a neutral state. To go back to Rivero, the current state of French law in relation 
to Muslim dress closely resembles the period between 1905 and the First World War when 
the secular authorities were often sniping at the Catholic Church, and that took a long time to 
reach a point of equilibrium which, perhaps, is being destabilised again as the Christmas Crib 
decision may illustrate.  
 
                                                          
27 See M. Hunter-Hénin, ‘Why the French don’t like the burqua: Laïcité, National Identity and Religious 
Freedom’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 1.  
